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 The Valuation Impact of Joint Ventures
 Introduction
 Business combinations have long been a prominent topic of interest, and have stimulat-
 ed a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature. In contrast to the extensive
 literature on mergers and tender offers, there has been relatively little attention to joint
 ventures, which are partial combinations. This paper addresses this gap in the finance
 literature by considering the financial characteristics of joint ventures and then examin-
 ing several hypotheses regarding stockholder wealth effects associated with such
 combinations. The importance of the joint venture in the international arena with re-
 spect to the diversification benefits which accrue to the shareholder is analyzed.
 Joint ventures are partial business combinations wherein two or more firms form a pro-
 fit-motivated entity after negotiating the financial and legal terms of the combination.
 This provides an opportunity to combine resources in optimal proportions rather than
 in the fixed portfolio positions dictated by a merger or tender offer. The participants
 are partners rather than an acquirer and a target, and thus the formation of a joint ven-
 ture does not provide the opportunity for one party to be the aggressor as in whole unit
 combination. The differing nature of the relationship between the parties and the selec-
 tive resource combination indicates that the wealth effects of joint ventures may be dif-
 ferent from those predicted by whole-unit combination.
 The following section reviews the evolution of the joint venture form of organization
 and the related literature. After the development of the hypotheses, the data and meth-
 odology are detailed. The empirical results and their interpretation follow and con-
 clusions are drawn in the final section.
 Development and Implications of Joint Ventures
 This paper emphasizes the relationship between partial business combination by joint
 venture and whole-unit business combinations by merger and acquisition. As a context
 for the analysis, the following has particular relevance:
 During the 1950's many enterprises focused on internal organization structure, such as
 divisions and subsidiaries, as one means of achieving growth and diversifications. The
 1960's brought a new concentration on external growth in the form mergers and acqui-
 sitions - which is still in mode today. In recent years, the joint venture is attracting
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 greater attention as a beneficial form of organization (Young and Bradford, 1977,
 p. vi).
 In the 1970's, there was a relatively high level of joint venture formation and this con-
 tinues. The F.T.C. records joint ventures that result in the formation of a new corpora-
 tion and that involve at least one U.S. participant corporation. Table 1 shows the num-
 ber of joint ventures recorded by the F.T.C. over the years 1972-1981 (Federal Trade
 Commission, Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, 1981, p. 175).
 Table 1: Joint Ventures Recorded by the F. T. C.
 Year Number Year Number
 of Ventures of Ventures
 1972 289 1977 115
 1973 247 1978 114
 1974 130 1979 85
 1975 82 1980 183
 1976 106 1981 212
 Several reasons for joint venture formation have been posited in press releases and the
 practitioner literature. These include the facilitation of technological transfer, develop-
 ing market structure, international diversification, and partial divestiture. Joint ven-
 tures appear to provide many testable hypotheses both domestic and international and
 will likely be the subject of considerable research in the future.
 The nature of joint venture raises many of the legal issues associated with mergers. In
 U.S. vs. Penn-Olin Co. (1964), it was construed that section 7 of the Clayton Act applies
 to joint ventures, and in monitoring joint venture activity, the F.T.C. applies provisions
 that are similar to those relating to whole-unit combination. It has been noted that:
 Joint ventures continue to constitute one of the most perplexing subjects in antitrust.
 An inquiry into joint venture theory must encompass an analysis of bbth structural (i.e.,
 merger) and conduct (i.e., collusion) elements of antitrust. Utilized in the past to ef-
 fectuate domestic and international cartels, joint ventures may also promote economic
 efficiency.1
 Caves (1982) discusses the impact of U.S. antitrust policy on the multinational firm:
 A series of cases after W.W.II attacked joint ventures that U.S. MNEs had formed with
 their overseas competitors. Some of these deals simply implemented agreements to di-
 vide markets and exclude foreign competitors from the United States, in which case
 domestic economic welfare was the main issue. Other joint ventures, however, had bol-
 stered U.S. MNEs ability to extract rents from foreign markets. The courts specifically
 rejected the contention that laws allowing U.S. producers to collude in export sales jus-
 tified joint or collusive behavior in establishing subsidiaries overseas. In short, U.S.
 antitrust policy has taken appreciable chances of losing rent from foreign markets in
 order to promote competition in the domestic economy.
 Joint venture formation also raises significant issues in labor law. As succession applies
 to merger and divestiture, it also applies to joint venture. However, the issues are less
 settled and considerable attention to resolution can be expected in the near future.
 Since these legal concerns can influence the nature of particular transactions (or even
 whether they take place), they are of direct concern to the resolution of uncertainty and
 its financial implications.2
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 Literature Review
 As partial business combinations, joint ventures may be studied within the context of
 the extensive literature on whole unit combinations. Many studies have addressed fi-
 nancial issues relating to mergers and tender offers. These include those by Bradley
 (1980), Dodd (1980), and Dodd and Ruback (1977). For whole-unit combination, there
 is consistant evidence of positive wealth effects for target firm stockholders, but little or
 no impact on the wealth of stockholders of acquirer firms. Joint venture formation is a
 significantly different transaction from mergers and tender offers, and the wealth im-
 pacts for stockholders of the parent firms participating in a joint venture may not be
 clearly predicted by the existing literature.
 A literature has evolved in economics addressing the impact of joint ventures on mar-
 ket structure, competition, and technological transfer. Patterns of joint venture forma-
 tion have been analyzed and questionnaires employed to evaluate experience with this
 organizational structure. Some analysis of the impact of organizational form on ac-
 counting based measures of rate of return have been undertaken. Armour and Teece
 (1978) analyze the effects of multi-divisional organization on return on equity in the oil
 industry. They discern a slight positive relationship between return on equity and the
 adoption of multi-divisional organizational form. Their hypotheses related to the con-
 cerns of agency theory. To the extent that joint ventures facilitate multi-divisional or-
 ganization, their results suggest a positive impact of joint venture. Berg and Friedman
 (1981) addressed domestic joint ventures, and in order to concentrate on the nature of
 the joint venture, partitioned their sample into two categories "knowledge acquisition"
 and "other."3 Using return on equity as the dependent variable, they found that the
 former type is associated with lower return on equity, the latter with higher. This study
 contrasts with the above in that it employs risk-adjusted and market-based returns, and
 it contrasts domestic with international joint venture.
 Caves (1982) presents the arguments for and against a multinational organization
 forming a joint venture. Arguments for include: 1) enconomizing on managerial or
 other human contributions, 2) risk minimization of extremely risky investments,
 3) diversification of sources of supply, 4) overcoming large initial investments, 5) over-
 coming lack of certain skill or expertize, 6) governmental requirement and 7)
 economizing on information requirements or expertize about foreign investments. Ar-
 guments against the formation of joint ventures include: 1) the possession of an intan-
 gible asset puts the joint venture partner at risk because the other partner may steal the
 idea or expertize, 2) joint control may be troublesome, 3) the free rider problem,
 4) worldwide versus local points of view, 5) transfer pricing problems and 6) host
 government regulation.
 Weighing the costs and benefits and pros and cons of forming a joint venture is an in-
 teresting area of inquiry. However the fact remains that a large number of firms elected
 the joint venture form, and an important question is how did the firms shareholders
 react to the information about the joint venture in the short run. Did the shareholders
 preceive the joint venture as a favorable course of action perhaps providing diversifi-
 cation benefits which was not otherwise available. Or did they perceive the joint ven-
 ture in a negative light as the firm was giving up something of value. The latter relies on
 the shareholders predisposition to the idea of the joint venture. The former relies on the
 degree of imperfection or market segmentation perceived by the shareholder. A third
 alternative is that the joint venture per se did not add anything of value from the short
 run perspective of the firm's shareholders.
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 There has been considerable analysis of the extent to which international capital mar-
 kets are segmented by national boundaries.4 When international capital markets are
 less than completely and directly integrated, investor alternatives are constrained and
 some investment opportunities may be possible only indirectly by holding the stock of
 firms with multinational operations. If multinational operations do enable a firm to
 provide investors with valuable diversification services (i.e., a dominating opportunity
 set), then this will be reflected in the stock price of such firms. Hughes, Logue, and
 Sweeney (1975) tested several hypotheses and concluded that multinational companies
 do provide a service for investors. The investigation of multinational operations has re-
 ceived further attention in studies such as Adler and Dumas (1975), Dumas (1978), and
 Lee and Sachdeva (1977). In this multinational context, a joint venture with a foreign
 participant provides an opportunity to increase the level of foreign operations and po-
 tentially the value of diversification benefits to investors. We are thus provided with the
 opportunity to further investigate empirical evidence on the provision of valuable
 diversification services by multinational operations by the means of a joint venture.
 Hypothesized Effects of Joint Ventures
 The anticipated effect of domestic joint venture activity depends on whether the impact
 is expected to be similar to that experienced by the target or the acquirer in a whole-
 unit combination. With joint venture formation, there is not the potential aggressor role
 for one party and thus strategies of corporate control do not directly impact on the de-
 cision regarding participation. Stockholder voting is not involved and the decision is
 made by management. The parties participate on a voluntary basis and the venture is
 presumably subject to capital budgeting criteria. The effects of joint venture partici-
 pation for stockholder wealth will depend on whether it is a positive net present value
 project (i.e., plotting above the security market line) or a zero net present value project
 (as the majority of the evidence suggests for acquirer firm in mergers). It seems plau-
 sible to expect that a negative net present value venture would not be entered into. De-
 termining whether domestic joint ventures are positive or zero net present value pro-
 jects is an underlying goal of this study. We proceed with the null hypothesis that joint
 venture formation is a zero net present value project with no stockholder wealth im-
 pacts.
 In addition to the overall research question regarding the present value of domestic
 joint ventures, the potential for joint ventures to be a vehicle for the provision of valu-
 able international diversification services to home country investors requires investi-
 gation. To test the hypothesis that joint ventures with foreign partners provide diversifi-
 cation services, we contrast the valuation impacts of joint ventures with domestic part-
 ners with those where foreign partners are participants. This is a joint hypothesis of the
 net present value and diversification service provision of joint ventures with foreign
 partners.
 Data and Methodology
 The sample for this study was identified from the F.T.C. Statistical Report on Mergers
 and Acquisitions. This includes joint ventures that result in the formation of a new cor-
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 poration and where at least one of the venturers is a domestic firm. Additional criteria
 employed in this study were that the firms be NYSE or ASE listed firms and that public
 announcements regarding the joint ventures were reported in the Wall Street Journal.
 Hie day on which the first press report regarding the joint venture is made in the Wall
 Street Journal is the announcement date.5 As is usual in studies of this type, there is
 some ambiguity regarding the tradiirg day when the announcement occurs. If the press
 release was made before the close of trading on the day before it was reported in the
 Wall Street Journal, then the actual event day is - 1. The application of the above cri-
 teria to the F.T.C. recorded joint ventures over the period 1976-1979 resulted in a total
 sample of 208 joint venture transactions. The daily returns for the individual joint ven-
 turers and the value weighted return for the market portfolio both came from the CRSP
 (Center for Research into Security Prices) tapes.
 In order to test the hypotheses of this study, the pattern of abnormal returns over the
 101 trading day interval from 50 days before to 50 days after (-50, 50) the even is de-
 rived and analyzed. It is assumed that the one-factor market model is a valid represen-
 tation of the return generating process. The modell is presented below.
 (1) Rjt = aj + #Rmt + £jt
 where:
 Rjt = The rate of return on security j over period t, the unit being one trading day.
 Rmt =» The rate of return on the value weighted market portfolio over day t.
 # = Covariance (Rjt, Rmt)/Variance (Rmt)
 otj =E(Rj)-/?jE(Rmt)
 ejt = The residual return on security j in period t.
 The assumptions relating to SJt are:
 E(£jt) =0
 Var(*jt) =<t?
 Cov(*jt,Rmt) = 0.
 The use of the model is based on the assumption of bivariate normality of both
 security and portfolio returns. In recognition of the stationarity assumptions of the
 market model, and the potential impact on estimation of the announcement event, the
 model is estimated twice. Defining day 0 to be the announcement trading day, the
 respective estimation intervals are (- 200, - 5 1) and + 51,+ 200).
 For each trading day t in (- 50, 50), the abnormal return for firm j is:
 ARjt=Rjt-((£j + )ffjRmt)
 where:
 #j and $ are estimated over (- 200, - 51) for t e (- 50, 0)
 Aj and fi-} are estimated over (+51,+ 200) for t e (+ 1 , + 50) .
 For each trading day t (- 50, 50) the average abnormal return is defined as:
 Nt
 ARjt = ARt=l/NtX ARjt
 where:
 Nt = the number of firms with an abnormal return defined in day t.
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 The cumulative average abnormal return is defined as:
 t
 CARt= X ARt.
 t=-50
 The cumulative average abnormal return over the interval t! to t2 inclusive is:
 CAR{J= f ARt.
 t=-ti
 The interval has length L = t2 - tj + 2. This reflects the requirement that t2 does not
 precede ti in event time.
 To test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns in event day t, the following
 t-statistic is calculated:
 t = ARt/<7t
 where:
 ARt = as defined in (2)
 r 50 / / so \\211/2
 <jt =1/100 Z (ARi-( S ARi/lOOll
 To test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return accumulation over specified inter-
 vals (tj , t2), the Z test statistic is employed.
 y/2
 In -^h CSARi (n-2).
 where:
 N is the number of firms with abnormal returns
 L is t2 - tj + 1 the length of time over which abnormal returns are measured
 n is the number of observations
 CSAR! is the cumulations of average standardized abnormal returns over integral I.
 A derivation of the test Z statistic is shown in Appendix A.
 Results
 The abnormal return analysis was applied to the overall sample and two partitions -
 domestic, wherein all parties were domestic; and international, with one of the ventures
 a foreign firm. The three sets of results are presented in a similar manner. Individual
 day abnormal returns (AR's), their accumulation (CAR's), and t-statistics are given in
 one table, followed by interval tests of the significance of abnormal return accumu-
 lation over pertinent intervals relative to the announcement event.
 Overall Results
 The individual day results are presented in Table 2 and there is little evidence of statis-
 tically significant abnormal returns. The day - 1 abnormal a return is 0.24 percent with
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 Table 2: A verage A bnormal Returns (A Rs), Cumulative A verage A bnormal Returns
 (CARs), and T-Statistics - Overall Sample
 Day AR(%) CAR(%) t-statistics
 -50 -0.05 -0.05 -0.35
 -40 -0.15 -0.37 -1.15
 -30 0.09 -0.40 0.66
 -20 0.1^ -0.88 0.90
 -10 0.14 -1.30 1.03
 - 9 -0.06 -1.37 -0.49
 - 8 -0.04 -1.40 -0.29
 - 7 -0.14 -1.54 -1.05
 - 6 -0.05 -1.49 -0.41
 - 5 -0.23 -1.72 -1.79
 - 4 -0.04 -1.76 -0.28
 - 3 0.14 -1.62 1.06
 - 2 -0.05 -1.67 -0.30
 - 1 0.24 -1.43 1.85
 0 0.08 -1.35 0.61
 + 1 -0.09 -1.44 -0.69
 + 2 -0.08 -1.52 -0.59
 + 3 0.23 -1.29 1.76
 + 4 0.02 - 1.27 0.16
 + 5 -0.24 -1.50 -1.80
 + 6 0.17 -1.33 1.28
 + 7 0.06 -1.27 0.49
 + 8 -0.01 -1.28 -0.10
 + 9 0.16 -1.12 1.24
 + 10 -0.04 -1.16 -0.30
 + 20 0.12 -0.17 0.88
 + 30 -0.01 -0.32 -0.08
 +40 -0.08 -0.23 -0.37
 + 50 0.02 -0.21 0.16
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
 a t-statistic of 1.86.6 As noted earlier, if a joint venture announcement that was reported
 in the WSJ on day 0 was released before the close of trade on the previous day, then the
 "true" event day is - 1. Thus, the day - 1 result can be interpreted as indicating a posi-
 tive stock price response to the joint venture announcement. However, the reaction is
 not particularly strong, and we cannot reject the null hypotheses of zero abnormal re-
 turn performance at the announcement of a joint venture.
 The results suggest that the formation of a joint venture is not significantly different
 from a zero net present value project. Furthermore, the impact on stock price is similar
 to that of an acquirer in whole-unit business combination.
 Table 3 presents interval tests of the significance of abnormal return accumulation over
 specified intervals relative to the announcement. This shows little significant accumu-
 lation in the interval immediately surrounding the announcement but a tendency for
 negative accumulation prior to day 0 and for positive accumulation over most intervals
 subsequent to day 0. However, given the preponderence of evidence in support of mar-
 ket efficiency, we do not attribute effects other than over intervals immediately preced-
 ing and at the announcement to the joint venture formation.
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 Table 3: Z-Scores of Abnormal Return Over Intervals Relative to the
 Announcement - Overall Sample
 Interval Z-score
 -50 to 0 -1.91
 -25 to 0 -2.22*
 -20 to -10 -1.08
 -10 to 0 -0.08
 - 5 to 0 0.28
 + 1 to + 5 - 1.60
 + lto+10 0.21
 + 11 to +20 2.69**
 + lto+25 1.79
 + lto+50 0.89
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
 Table 4: Average Abnormal Returns (A Rs), Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
 (CARs), and T-Statistics - Domestic Subsample
 Day AR(%) CAR(%) t-statistics
 _50 0.02 0.02 0.08
 _40 0.09 -0.23 0.38
 _30 -0.09 -0.46 -0.38
 -20 -0.09 -1.80 -0.40
 -10 0.30 -1.99 1.34
 _ 9 0.07 -1.91 0.31
 - 8 -0.05 -1.96 -0.23
 _ 7 0.00 -1.97 0.02
 - 6 0.30 -1.66 1.36
 _ 5 -0.31 -1.97 -1.38
 _ 4 -0.26 -2.23 -1.15
 _ 3 0.14 -2.10 0.60
 _ 3 0.13 -1.96 0.59
 _ i 0.22 -1.75 0.96
 0 0.18 -1.57 0.78
 + 1 -0.30 -1.87 -1.33
 + 2 -0.08 -1.95 -0.35
 + 3 0.46 -1.49 2.08*
 + 4 -0.01 -1.49 -0.03
 + 5 -0.19 -1.69 -0.86
 + 6 0.14 -1.55 0.63
 + 7 0.02 -1.52 0.09
 + 8 -0.23 -1.75 -1.02
 + 9 0.25 -1.50 1.12
 + 10 -0.09 -1.59 -0.39
 + 20 0.30 -0.43 1.33
 + 30 -0.07 -1.50 -0.33
 +40 -0.06 -1.56 -0.28
 + 50 0.06 -0.91 0.26
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
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 Table 5: Z-Scores of Abnormal Return Over Intervals Relative to the
 Announcement - Domestic Subsample
 Interval Z-scores
 -50 to 0 -1.60
 -25 to 0 -2.14*
 -20 to -10 -1.03
 -10 to 0 1.03
 - 5 to 0 0.43
 + lto+ 5 -1.635
 + lto+10 -0.50
 + 11 to +20 1.75**
 + lto+25 0.56
 + 1 to +50 0.12
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
 Domestic Joint Ventures
 Of the 208 joint ventures identified for this study, 90 are domestic and 118 inter-
 national. Insufficiency of data requirements for the methodology resulted in a final
 sample of 80 domestic and 1 10 foreign venture events. In this section, the results of the
 separate analysis of the domestic joint ventures are reported. As with the overall
 sample, there is little evidence of significant abnormal returns. Because of the partition-
 ing and associated reduction in sample size, a day - 1 abnormal return of 0.22 percent
 (similar in magnitude to the overall day - 1 AR of 0.24%) has a t-statistic of only 0.96.
 The interval accumulation significance tests of Table 5 indicate little significance in the
 abnormal returns in the intervals immediately surrounding the announcement.
 With the domestic sub-sample, there is little evidence that joint ventures are other than
 zero net present value projects, and consequently, there is no change in the value of
 participating firms.
 International Joint Ventures
 The analysis of international joint ventures provides further evidence on the potential
 for international operations to provide diversification services for investors who may
 face at least partially segmented capital markets. The results for international ventures
 are presented in Tables 6 and 7. There is little evidence of significant valuation effects
 being associated with the formation of international joint ventures. As one looks at the
 signs of the abnormal returns and also the cumulative abnormal returns, there seems to
 be a disproportionate number of negatives. This may be caused by the fact that even
 though the agreement of a joint venture may be valuable or at a minimizing a zero
 NPV investment a joint venture announcement may convey bad news about a corpor-
 ation. To see this, consider a firm which wants to make an investment which is con-
 sidered to have a positive impact on the firm's value; furthermore, knowledge about
 this investment plan is well known. If the firm announces that it is going to undertake
 this investment with some other organization, investors may revise downward their ex-
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 Table 6: Average Abnormal Returns (ARs), Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
 (CARs), and T-Statistics - International Sample
 Day AR(%) CAR(%) t-statistics
 -50 0.05 0.05 0.28
 -40 -0.32 -0.30 -1.79
 -30 0.26 -0.10 1.43
 -20 0.12 0.12 0.65
 -10 0.21 -0.46 1.19
 - 9 -0.09 -0.55 -0.51
 - 8 -0.03 -0.58 -0.19
 - 7 -0.31 -0.89 -1.73
 - 6 0.06 -0.83 0.31
 - 5 -0.12 -0.96 -0.69
 - 4 0.08 -0.88 0.43
 - 3 -0.12 -0.76 0.64
 - 2 -0.32 -1.08 -1.81
 - 1 0.19 -0.89 1.06
 0 0.15 -0.74 0.85
 + 1 -0.07 -0.81 -0.41
 + 2 0.04 -0.78 0.21
 + 3 -0.06 -0.83 -0.31
 + 4 0.09 -0.75 0.47
 + 5 -0.43 -1.18 -2.46*
 + 6 0.27 -0.90 1.54
 + 7 0.07 -0.84 0.37
 + 8 0.11 -0.73 0.60
 + 9 0.03 -0.69 0.19
 + 10 -0.02 -0.71 -0.11
 +20 0.14 -0.06 0.80
 + 30 -0.16 0.53 -0.89
 +40 -0.08 -0.14 -0.43
 + 50 0.09 -0.01 0.48
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
 Table 7: Z-Scores of Abnormal Return Over Intervals Relative to the
 Announcement - International Sub-Sample
 Interval Z-score
 -50 to 0 -0.51
 -25 to 0 -1.18
 -20 to -10 -0.79
 -10 to 0 -0.70
 - 5 to 0 -0.27
 + lto+ 5 -1.36
 + lto+10 0.25
 + 11 to +20 1.75
 + lto+25 1.56
 + lto+50 0.63
 * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level.
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 pectations of the gains from the investment which now must be shared between the
 partners of the joint venture, thereby putting downward pressure on the firm's stock
 price.
 Comparison of the results for the domestic and international subsamples shows that
 there is little difference in abnormal returns around the announcement of a joint ven-
 ture of either type. In relative terms, the accumulation over intervals immediately pre-
 ceding day 0 is greater for the domestic sub-sample. We cannot reject the null hypoth-
 esis that international joint ventures provide no diversification services for stockholders
 of domestic participant firms. Yet, with the international sub-sample, we are testing a
 joint hypothesis that international joint ventures are zero net present value projects and
 that joint ventures are not a means of providing valuable diversification services for
 stockholders of the domestic firm. To the extent that the net present value character-
 istics of domestic and joint ventures are different, we are unable to separate the joint
 hypotheses tested in this section.
 Conclusions
 This study considered joint ventures as partial business combinations and contrasted
 them with the more familiare whole-unit business combination by merger and tender
 offer. Joint ventures have been emerging as an increasingly popular organizational
 form for both domestic and international firms. There is considerable economic and
 legal literature regarding joint ventures, but they have received relatively little at-
 tention from a finance perspective. Analyzing a sample of 208 joint ventures, this study
 found no significant evidence of abnormal returns being associated with joint venture
 formation. Such ventures appear to be approximately zero net present value projects,
 and the wealth effect for stockholders of participating firms is similar to that for ac-
 quirer firms in whole-unit combination.
 Partitioning of the sample into domestic and international ventures did not give rise to
 significantly different patterns of abnormal return accumulation. There was little evi-
 dence that joint ventures provide valuable diversification services in the short run. The
 formation of a joint venture is a new operation which provides no history of perform-
 ance. Given the relatively short period over which the abnormal returns were analyzed
 we conclude that in the short run at least shareholders perceive no diversification gains
 from the joint ventures. It may be that over longer periods of time, shareholders may
 perceive positive or negative effects as more information about the success of failure of
 the joint venture becomes known. This observation opens up the possibility of future
 research into the questions of not only are there long versus short run differences in the
 shareholders perception of joint ventures, but also how effective is management in
 structuring the joint venture relationship so as to add something of value to the firm.
 Further work is required in analyzing the nature, location, and specific cash flows of
 international joint ventures in order to determine if there are differences between joint
 ventures of U.S. and foreign partners when they are located in the U.S. compared to
 those located outside of the U.S.
 Rather than being the definitive work on joint ventures, this paper provides a possible
 framework of analysis, raises some important issues, and serves as a springboard for fu-
 ture research into this interesting area of inquiry.
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 Footnotes
 1 Reflecting the similarity between partial and whole-unit combination, this quotation is from an
 F.T.C. Merger Session (Merger Policy Series, 1979).
 2 The joint venture between General Motors and Toyota to produce automobiles at Freemont,
 California is highlighting the relevance of labor law to joint ventures.
 3 The "other" category included marketing, construction, exploration, and drilling.
 4 Studies that have addressed international capital market segmentation and asset pricing impli-
 cations include Graner, Litzenberger, and Stehle (1976), Grubel (1976), Grubel and Fadner
 (1971), Lessard (1974), Leug and Surnat (1970), Solnik (1974), and Subrahmanyan (1975).
 5 In the following discussion, this will also be referred to as the event day and as day 0 (zero).
 6 The relatively small magnitude of the AR to the test statistic reflects the impact of a relatively
 large sample size on the variance of returns of the portfolio of joint ventures. For the domestic
 joint venture sub-sample, a similar magnitude AR on day - 1 has t-statistic approximately fo that
 of the overall sample.
 References
 Adler, M./Dumas, B (1975): Optimal International Acquisitions, Journal of Finance 30, pp. 1-19.
 Armour, H. O./Teece, D. (1978): Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of
 the Multidivisional Hypothesis, Bell Journal of Economics 9, pp. 106-122.
 Berg, S. V./Friedman, P. (1981): Impacts of Domestic Joint Ventures on Industrial Rates of Re-
 turn: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis, 1964-1975, The Review of Economics and Statistics
 63, pp. 293-298.
 Bradley, M. (1980): Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal oj
 Business 54, pp. 345-376.
 Caves, R. (1982): Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press,
 London.
 Dumas, B. (1978): The Theory of the Trading Firm Revisited, The Journal of Finance 32,
 pp. 1019-1033.
 Degroot, M. (1975): Probability and Statistics, Addison- Wesley, Massachusetts.
 Dodd, P. (1980): Merger Proposals, Management Discretion, and Stockholder Wealth, Journal of
 Financial Economics 8, pp 105-137.
 Dodd, P./Ruback, R (1977): Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns, Journal of Financial Eco-
 nomics 5, pp. 351-373.
 Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions,
 various issues, Washington, D.C.
 Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, Merger Policy Series, May 10, 1979,
 Washington, D.C.
 Grauer, F. L. A. /Litzenberger, R. HVStehle, R. E. (1976): Sharing Rules and bquilibnum in an
 International Capital Market Under Uncertainty, Journal of Financial Economics 3,
 pp. 233-256.
 Grubel, H. G. (1978): Internationally Diversihed Portfolios: Weltare (Jains ana capital mows,
 American Economic Review 58, pp. 1299-1314.
 Grubel, H. G./Fadner, K. (1971): Hie Interdependence of International Equity Markets, Journal
 of Finance 26, pp. 89-94.
 Hughes, J. S./Logue, D. E./Sweeney, R. S. (1975): Corporate International Diversihcation, ana
 Market Assigned Measures of Risk and Diversification, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
 Analysis 10, pp. 627-637.
 Jensen, M. C./Meckling, W. H. (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
 and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp. 305-360.
 Lee, W./Sachdeva, K. (1972): The Role of the Multinational Company in the Integration of Seg-
 mented Capital Markets, Journal of Finance 32, pp. 479-492.
 Lessard, D. (1974): World, National and Industry Factors in Equity Returns, Journal of Finance
 29, pp. 379-391.
 MIR, Vol. 26, 1986/2 25
 Levy, HVSarner, M. (1970): International Diversification of Investment Portfolios, American Eco-
 nomic Review 60, pp. 668-675.
 Solnik, B. (1974): An Equilibrium Model of the International Capital Market, Journal of Econom-
 ic Theory, pp. 500-526.
 Subrahmanyam, M. (1975): "On the Optimality of International Capital Market Integration,"
 Journal of Financial Economics 2, pp. 3-28.
 Young, G. RVBradford, S. Jr.: Joint Ventures: Planning and Action, Financial Executives Re-
 search Foundation 1977, New York, 106 pp.
 Appendix A
 Derivation of the test Z-statistic
 The standardized abnormal return for firm j in period t is defined as:
 (1) SARjt = ARjt(S(ARjt))
 where:
 L t-l U*mt~ Kia/ J
 a\ = estimated variance of the disturbance term from the OLS estimation of the market model
 for security j.
 Rm = The mean return on the value weighted market portfolio over the parameter estimation
 interval for security j.
 n = The number of observations (length of the interval) over which the parameters are esti-
 mated (n = 150).
 The average standardized abnormal return over N firms in day t is defined as:
 N
 ASARt=l/N£SARjt
 j-i
 and the average standardized abnormal return over the interval I (with trading day extrema tj
 and t2) is:
 t2
 ASAR,= 1/L£ ASARt
 t-ti
 where:
 L = t2-t, + l.
 The cumulation of average standardized abnormal returns over the interval I is:
 t2
 CSAR,= Ya ASARt •
 t-ti
 Then the statistic defined in (4) and (5) has a distribution that is approximately standard abnor-
 mal when the number of firms (N) is sufficiently large. The statistic is employed to test the null
 hypothesis of zero abnormal accumulation over specified interval relative to the event.
 « z-,(.-y
 Ml <NL>1"
 Vn
 IN 71^2 CSAR"(n-2)J Q.E.D.
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